Computational aspects of the FLBC framework by Daskalopulu, A & Sergot, M
Computational Aspects of the FLBC Framework
Aspassia Daskalopulu
Department of Computer Science
King’s College London
The Strand, London WC2R 2LS, U.K.
aspassia@dcs.kcl.ac.uk
Marek Sergot
Department of Computing
Imperial College London
180 Queen’s Gate, London SW7 2BZ, U.K.
mjs@doc.ic.ac.uk
Abstract
Recent research has sought to develop formal languages for business communication as more expressive, flexible and
powerful alternatives to current EDI standards, with potential benefits both for business-to-business exchanges in e-
commerce and for general intra-organizational communication.  A prominent approach in this area has become known as
FLBC and is grounded on speech-act theory, event semantics and thematic rôles, and first-order logic (FOL).  In this paper
we discuss some of the specific technical choices for the representation of messages in the original FLBC framework and
propose two modifications.  The first eliminates a problematic modal logical component from the representations of
messages; the second transforms the message representation into Skolemised clausal form.  Focusing on two different
computational tasks we illustrate how existing computational methods can be employed directly on the resulting
representation for messages.  We also propose an alternative formulation for messages using C-logic and discuss possible
extensions to the resulting modified FLBC framework, for example in establishing whether an exchange is meaningful and
in compliance with the setting in which the parties have pre-agreed to operate.  Finally we consider some open problems and
identify directions for future developments.
Keywords: formal languages for business communication, electronic data interchange, EDI, electronic commerce, speech
acts, event semantics, thematic rôles, logic programming.
1 Introduction
Recent research has sought to develop formal languages for business communication as more expressive,
flexible and powerful alternatives to current EDI standards, with potential benefits both for business-to-business
exchanges in an e-commerce setting and for general intra-organizational communication in the context of office
automation systems.  A prominent approach in this area has become known as FLBC (Formal Language for
Business Communication).  First proposed by Kimbrough and his associates (see e.g. [12–17]), FLBC is
grounded on speech-act theory, event semantics, and first-order logic (FOL).  Work on its further development
and deployment continues.
The main premise underlying FLBC is that messages exchanged between parties are made up of statements that
can be analysed and represented in the F(P) framework of speech act theory.  Speech act theory, whose origins
are traced in the work of Austin [1] and Searle [22], is concerned with the analysis and representation of
utterances.  In Austin’s terms, each utterance has a locutionary aspect (what is being said, the truth-functional
content, the P-component), an illocutionary aspect (the force in saying something, the speaker’s attitude towards
the content, the F-component) and a perlocutionary aspect (what is achieved by saying something, what effect
the speaker intends the utterance to have on the hearer).  Speech act theory seeks to identify the main types of
utterances in terms of their illocutionary aspect and to provide a systematic explication for each of these types in
terms of the information conveyed between a speaker and a hearer and the conditions in which it is used
successfully.  Illocutionary forces are identified by verbs, which may be explicitly used by a speaker or alluded
to in a given context.  Hence, there are as many ways for a speaker to express the same attitude towards a given
content as there are available appropriate verbs.  For example, to issue a promise to meet his interlocutor a
speaker might say “I promise to meet you”, or “I will meet you”, or “I will be there” (in the context of a
dialogue) and so on.  Speech act theory offers general categorization schemes for illocutionary forces (for
example [1,2,23]). The relative merits and disadvantages of each scheme are beyond the scope of this paper.
However, in all categorization schemes, clusters of specific verbs are grouped together under the illocutionary
force that they are all meant to convey and they all share the perlocutionary aspect associated with that
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illocutionary force.  For illustration, Table 1 summarizes Austin’s (1962) classification of illocutionary forces
[1] and shows some examples of specific verbs associated with each type.
Illocutionary Force Explication Performative verbs
Verdictive Giving a verdict by a jury arbitrator or umpire, or
giving an estimate, reckoning or appraisal.  An
exercise of speaker’s judgement.  Committing
hearer/others to certain future conduct.
Acquit, convict, grade, assess,
locate, measure, find (as a
matter of fact), rule, diagnose
etc.
Exercitives Assertion of influence or exercising of powers or
rights.  Giving a decision that something is to be
so.  Creating obligations, permissions or
prohibitions for hearer/others.
Appoint, vote, order, urge,
advise, warn, dismiss, demote,
name, bequeath, proclaim,
resign, nominate, recommend
etc.
Commissives Committing speaker to a course of action.
Assuming of an obligation or declaring of
intention.
Promise, undertake, intend,
plan, shall, adopt, oppose,
guarantee, consent etc.
Behabitives Describing speaker’s reaction to other people’s
behaviour or states of affairs.  Adopting an
attitude.
Apologize, thank,
commiserate, resent,
welcome, protest, challenge
etc.
Expositives Describing views, clarifying reasons, arguments
and communications.
Affirm, deny, state, identify,
inform, postulate, interpret,
agree etc.
Table 1 Austin's classification of illocutionary forces [1]
In contrast to current EDI representations, FLBC attempts to represent messages by making explicit their
primary function (whether they are offers, acceptances to offers, promises, requests for services or goods,
instructions for payment and so on—the F-component) and their locutionary content (the P-component).  The F-
component of a message is identified and represented using event semantics and thematic rôles [21] expressed
in FOL, essentially in the same way that ‘semantic cases’ of case grammars [6,7] have been used in FOL
representations in Artificial Intelligence (see e.g. [18, Ch.2], [3, Ch. 4]).  As Kimbrough points out [13], in this
way verbs can be represented as FOL predicates which take events as their arguments, and verb modifiers
(thematic rôles) correspond to FOL predicates that associate individuals and events.  Kimbrough demonstrates
through an example how all predicates required for such representation fall into three categories, namely
application-specific predicates, thematic rôles and kernel vocabulary.  This, Kimbrough argues, makes the
approach all the more attractive as it indicates that it is feasible to construct public, broad-utility lexicons and
goes some way towards providing standards to replace current EDI schemes.  In FLBC each message is also
associated with various conditions.  Such conditions explicate, for instance, what makes a promise ‘kept’, a
request ‘honored’, an assertion ‘veridical’ and so on, depending on the type of the message.
In this paper we do not question the motivation and general spirit of the FLBC approach, which seem to us to be
clear and well established, but rather discuss some of the specific technical choices in the original FLBC scheme
for the representation of messages.  Some of our comments are based on our previous experiences in modelling
exchanges that establish contractual relations between parties [5].  Such exchanges typically include statements
such as requests, promises, and assertions of a promissory nature as well as information-seeking questions.  The
aim of the paper is to suggest some simplifications of the FLBC representation scheme and identify prospects
and directions for further development.  In what follows we concentrate mainly on the representation of
promissory statements, but the points we wish to make apply generally to the FLBC representation scheme.  For
illustration purposes, we use an example that is similar to those used by Kimbrough [13].  It should be noted that
some of the issues raised in this paper are discussed also in recent work by Kimbrough. See e.g. [14] which may
be seen as endorsing some of the points raised here.
2 Event descriptions and thematic rôles
Consider the following exchange between Peter and Susan:
Peter: I would like to order a pizza from your menu please.
Susan: Certainly.  What kind of pizza would you like and what size?
Peter: The “Good Earth Vegetarian”* please, but without onions.  Large, please.
Susan: Very well, that will be £13.95, cash please.  What is the address?
Peter: 12 Hunger Lane.  How long will that be?
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Susan: It is now 7 pm and we promise to deliver within half an hour.  If our driver 
takes any longer than that, we deduct £1.00 from your bill.
Peter: Ok, thank you.
*The menu description of “Good Earth Vegetarian”: mushrooms, onions, red and green peppers,
all topped with mozzarella.
The utterances that make up the exchange, such as Peter’s request that initiates it, Susan’s acknowledgement
and promise for delivery, and Peter’s promise for payment, among others, can be analysed in order to identify
their primary function and then represented in FOL.  The individual utterances of the exchange are represented
in speech act theoretic terms using event semantics and thematic rôles.  Let us first illustrate Kimbrough’s idea
by showing how one of the utterances (Peter’s request for the delivery of a pizza) can be represented.  The
representation we show is different in several important respects from the one originally proposed by
Kimbrough.  We discuss these differences and possible variations in later sections.
Kimbrough’s idea is essentially the following:  Every utterance conforms to the F(P) framework of speech act
theory, that is, every utterance U can be rewritten in F(P) form (U   F(P)), where F is an illocutionary force
(such as ‘assert’, ‘promise’, ‘request’, ‘confirm’ etc.) and P is the propositional content of the utterance.  For
example the F(P) structure of the utterance “Peter requested that Susan deliver a pizza” is
request(“Susan delivers a pizza to Peter”)
For the utterances of interest, both the F-component and the P-component can be represented as events whose
attributes are described in terms of thematic rôles [21].  Thus, the statement “Peter requested that Susan
delivered a pizza” can be modelled as a requesting event with Peter as its agent, Susan as its recipient, and
whose ‘theme’ or ‘content’ is another event, the delivering of a pizza.  Pictorially, Peter’s request can be viewed
as shown in Figure 1.
e1
peter
susan
g
request
delivery
e2
recipient
type
theme
agent
type
recipient agent
theme
Figure 1 A request for delivery
In Figure 1, the propositional content of the example utterance (“Peter requested that Susan deliver a pizza”) is
modelled as a delivery event with Susan as its agent, Peter as its beneficiary, and the pizza (which can be
described, if desirable, in more detail in terms of its size and toppings) as its ‘theme’.  A rendition in first-order
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logic is as follows, where the pizza is left for the moment un-analyzed; we assume that g is a name constant for
it:
 e  e’[request(e)  agent(e, peter)  recipient(e, susan) 
theme(e, e’)  delivery(e’)  agent(e’, susan) 
recipient(e’, peter)  theme(e’, g)  pizza(g)]
After Skolemization and conversion to normal form this FOL representation gives rise to the following
collection of assertions, where e1 and e2 are now Skolem constants naming the request and delivery events:
request(e1).
agent(e1, peter).
recipient(e1, susan).
theme(e1, e2).
delivery(e2).
agent(e2, susan).
recipient(e2, peter).
theme(e2, g).
pizza(g).
(A1)
Susan’s promise to deliver a pizza to Peter can be represented in similar fashion as an event of type ‘promise’
whose ‘theme’ is another event of type ‘delivery’:
promise(e3).
agent(e3, susan).
recipient(e3, peter).
theme(e3, e4).
delivery(e4).
agent(e4, susan).
recipient(e4, peter).
theme(e4, f).
pizza(f).
(A2)
Nested utterances can be represented straightforwardly in the same manner.  For example, the utterance “Peter
requests that Susan promises to deliver a pizza” can be expressed as a requesting event whose ‘theme’ is a
promising event whose ‘theme’ is a delivery event (and similarly for longer chains of nested events).
The collection of thematic rôles employed in the original FLBC framework by Kimbrough is drawn from a
scheme of Parsons [21]; Table 2 shows some examples of such rôles (or ‘semantic cases’ in case grammar
terms).  In the representation fragments (A1) and (A2) above we restricted ourselves to ‘agent’, ‘theme’ and
‘recipient’ for the sake of simplicity.  Any collection of thematic rôles can be used as predicates associating
events with their individual aspects, as appropriate, and the representation can be easily adjusted to
accommodate them.  As Kimbrough observes, some standard lexicon of rôles will have to be agreed by the
various parties in any given application; there seems to be nothing problematic about reaching such an
agreement.
Rôle Description
Agent Volitional initiator of action
Patient Object or individual undergoing action
Theme Object or individual moved by action
Goal Individual toward which action is directed
Source Object or individual from which something is moved by the event, of from which
the event originates
Experiencer Individual experiencing some event
Beneficiary Object that benefits from the event
Location Place at which the event is situated
Instrument Secondary cause of event; the object or individual that causes some event that in
turn causes the event to take place
Table 2 Examples of thematic rôles from Kimbrough [13]
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The representation constructed so far, for two of the utterances of the example, has two features that we wish to
comment on at this point.  First, we have represented messages (Peter’s request for delivery and Susan’s
promise for delivery) prima facie.  That is to say, we have constructed logical formulations of the messages as
they appear, without reference to the context in which they are exchanged.  Such context might include, for
example: agreed conversation policies between the parties to an exchange; agreed procedures for interpreting
messages and for deriving inferences from them to establish what a party’s appropriate subsequent response to a
received message might be or to determine what action a party might be expected to take as a result of issuing a
message; an agreed lexicon of predicates and terms to be used in messages, and so on.  The assumption is that
standard routine messages of the type intended for representation in FLBC, exchanged in the normal course of
business, will not have to contain explicit representations of all the procedures and conventions agreed by the
parties for the conduct of their business.  This assumption is a feature of the original FLBC framework and we
see no reason to question it.
Second, as demonstrated with the example representation so far, we allow events themselves to be the ‘themes’
of other events in exactly the same way that (physical) objects can be the themes of events.  Thus, the delivery
event stipulated by Peter is the theme (or ‘direct object’) of the requesting event that he initiates, and the
delivery event stipulated by Susan is the theme of the promising event that she puts forward, just as a pizza g is
the theme of a delivery event.  In this way, the content of an F-event (such as a request or a promise event) is
directly accessible in the representation in the same way that the content of a P-event (such as a delivery event)
is accessible.  Queries of the form “what does Peter request?” can be answered as easily as queries of the form
“what does Susan deliver?”.  This is one important respect in which our representation differs from
Kimbrough’s original proposal.  We will return to this point in section 4 below.
We are aware that in adopting this use of the term ‘theme’ as a synonym for ‘patient’ or ‘direct object’ we are
departing from the set of thematic rôles suggested by Parsons [21] and followed by Kimbrough in FLBC. This is
just for simplicity: we do not need, for the purposes of this paper, to distinguish between the ‘theme’, ‘patient’
and ‘direct object’ of an event. We choose ‘theme’ as a suitably neutral term for all three.
In addition to providing means of querying message representations in order to extract the features of interest, it
is also straightforward to devise tools to help with the construction of FLBC representations.  In particular, it is
possible to formulate various constraints that a message must satisfy and arrange for these constraints to be
checked as the representation is constructed.  For example, one cannot meaningfully deliver something to
oneself, one cannot meaningfully promise to deliver something to oneself, one cannot meaningfully promise to
perform something in the past, and so on.  Such constraints are easily expressed and checked using standard
computational methods.  These constraints can express common sense features of events, legal requirements, or
other requirements that the parties might have agreed to abide by between themselves.  The ability to express
such constraints is an important advantage of the FLBC representation as we see it, and of great practical
significance.
3 Structured descriptions of objects
It might be felt that there is something suspicious about naming events in this manner and then making one
event the ‘theme’ (or ‘patient’ or ‘direct object’) of another.  Indeed, even the idea of naming events—some of
which may never actually happen—may already seem to be philosophically suspect.
We now wish to argue that there is nothing problematic about the use of these devices.  The argument hinges on
the difference between constants that name specific individuals and constants that are used essentially as internal
system identifiers on which to build representations of complex structured objects.
Let us turn first to the content (‘theme’) of the delivery event requested by Peter, the pizza.  This has been
represented by a name constant g, that is, by a unique identifier for a specific pizza.  Now this may seem
strange: in the context of ordering a pizza, is it much more likely that Peter requests an instance of a particular
type of pizza rather than a specific pizza by name (‘that one’)—but the latter is not impossible.  Although it is
rather fanciful to imagine customers requesting delivery of a specific pizza by name, it is very easy to think of
other similar examples where ordering by name is normal.  When John sends to Mary an offer to buy her car he
is not offering to purchase an instance of a type of car but a specific car that he will identify by name.  When
Jim, a car dealer, orders a Diablo Avenger from his supplier, on the other hand, he does not order a specific
Diablo Avenger by name but an instance of a car of that type.  In general we shall need to distinguish in the
representation between constants that are names of specific objects and constants that are identifiers for
unnamed instances of a given type of (structured) object.
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In the pizza example, it is likely that the content of the requested delivery event is not a specific named pizza but
an instance of a particular type of pizza.  That being so, the theme of the delivery event is naturally represented
in FOL by the existentially quantified statement:
 p [theme(e2,p)  pizza(p)  topping(p, mushroom)  topping(p, peppers) …]
We earlier suggested that the constant g in the representation could be seen as a name for a pizza.  But it can
also be seen as the Skolem constant introduced by Skolemisation of the existentially quantified statement above.
We assume that there will be some convention for distinguishing name constants from Skolem constants:
henceforth in this paper we shall point out Skolem constants where they are not obvious from context.  The
constant g in the representation earlier was intended to be a Skolem constant.
Exactly similar considerations arise in relation to the representation of events.  Constants e1, e2, … are
intended to be seen as internal identifiers used for building a structured representation of an event.  They can
also be seen as Skolem constants resulting from Skolemisation of existentially quantified expressions listing the
attributes (thematic rôles) of events.
The following examples illustrate how such Skolemisation can express a variety of different forms:
(a) Susan promises that a named pizza, f, will be delivered (without specifying by whom):
 e [promise(e)  agent(e, susan)  recipient(e, peter) 
  e’[theme(e, e’)  delivery(e’) 
recipient(e’, peter)  theme(e’, f)  pizza(f)]]
(A2.a)
The corresponding collection of assertions is:
promise(e2).
agent(e2, susan).
recipient(e2, peter).
theme(e2, e3).
delivery(e3).
recipient(e3, peter).
theme(e3, f).
pizza(f).
(b) Susan promises that a pizza (of a type) will be delivered (by her):
Replace the named pizza f by a Skolem constant (p1, say); add agent(e3, susan)
promise(e2).
agent(e2, susan).
recipient(e2, peter).
theme(e2, e3).
delivery(e3).
agent(e3, susan).
recipient(e3, peter).
theme(e3, p1).
pizza(p1).
In FOL, with existential quantifiers:
 e[promise(e)  agent(e, susan)  recipient(e, peter) 
 e’[theme(e, e’)  delivery(e’)  agent(e’, susan) 
recipient(e’, peter) 
 p[theme(e’, p)  pizza(p)]]]
(A2.b)
(c) Susan promises that a pizza (of a type) will be delivered by an employee of hers:
Replace agent(e3, susan) by an assertion about Skolem constant a1 (say) instead:
promise(e2).
agent(e2, susan).
recipient(e2, peter).
theme(e2, e3).
delivery(e3).
agent(e3, a1).
employee_of(a1, susan).
recipient(e3, peter).
theme(e3, p1).
pizza(p1).
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In FOL, with existential quantifiers:
 e[promise(e)  agent(e, susan)  recipient(e, peter) 
 e’[theme(e, e’)  delivery(e’) 
      a[agent(e’, a)  employee_of(a, susan)]  recipient(e’,peter)  
 p[theme(e’, p)  pizza(p)]]]
(A2.c)
(d) Susan promises that a pizza (of a type) will be delivered by John at 7:00 pm:
Replace the Skolem constant a1 by the name constant john; assert the time of the promised event e3.
promise(e2).
agent(e2, susan).
recipient(e2, peter).
theme(e2, e3).
delivery(e3).
agent(e3, john).
recipient(e3, peter).
theme(e3, p1).
pizza(p1).
time(e3, 7).
In FOL, with existential quantifiers:
 e[promise(e)  agent(e, susan)  recipient(e, peter) 
 e’[theme(e, e’)  delivery(e’)  agent(e’, john)  time(e’, 7) 
recipient(e’, peter) 
 p[theme(e’, p)  pizza(p)]]]
(A2.d)
Event names are naturally seen as Skolem constants, that is, as placeholders on which the structured
representation of an event can be built, rather than as name constants.
3.1 Logics of complex objects
The distinction between named objects and (named) instances of types of objects is a central feature of object-
oriented representations, where instances may be identical in every attribute yet still represent distinct
individuals.  ‘Object logics’, developed in the late 80s and early 90s, draw upon the areas of object-orientation
and logic programming to provide a framework for representing and reasoning with structured information.
From object-orientation they inherit the concepts of object identity, the notion of a complex object and
mechanisms for object classification and property inheritance.  From logic programming they inherit the
concepts of unification and answer substitution and a strategy for deductive query processing. See e.g. [9] for a
survey of the main approaches, beginning with O-logic [20], and following with further developments such as
extended O-logic [11], F-logic [10], and C-logic [4].  The field seems to have fallen dormant recently, subsumed
to a large extent under the development of ‘description logics’ (though the emphasis there is slightly different).
For present purposes, C-logic is particularly convenient.  It provides a shorthand for FLBC representations
which is both practical and natural, and—perhaps more importantly—allows us to expand on our remarks about
the use of Skolem constants as identifiers for structured representations of complex objects.
In object logics, a complex object is represented as a term of the language.  In C-logic, object descriptions take
the form:
ClassName : ObjectIdentifier[Attribute1  Value1, …, Attributek  Valuek]
The value of an attribute may be simple, an enumerated type, or another object description.  For example, the
following C-logic term represents an instance of type pizza:
pizza: p[
sizelarge,
base  thin,
toppings  {mushroom, peppers, cheese}
]
Informally, a C-logic term can be read as asserting the existence of an object of the specified type and structure;
in the example above, a pizza object with the stated structure and attributes.  Formally, the semantics in C-logic
is defined directly in terms of object, attribute and value structures.  There is also a translation of each C-logic
term into an equivalent set of FOL conjunctions in which object identifiers become constant symbols, class
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names are represented by unary predicates, and attributes are represented by binary predicates that take object
identifiers (or rather the constants introduced in the translation) and values as their arguments.  The general form
of a C-logic object term shown above is thus translated into the following set of FOL sentences:
ClassName(ObjectIdentifier).
Attribute1(ObjectIdentifier, Value1).
:
:
Attributek(ObjectIdentifier, Valuek).
Peter’s request for delivery of a pizza of a specific type can be represented in C-logic as follows:
request:e1[
agent  peter, recipient  susan,
theme  delivery:e2[
agent  susan, recipient  peter,
theme  pizza:p1[
size  large, base  thin,
toppings  {mushroom, peppers, cheese}
    ] ]    ]
 (C1.1)
His request for delivery of a specific named pizza g, on the other hand, can be represented as follows:
request:e1[
agent  peter, recipient  susan,
theme  delivery:e2[
agent  susan, recipient  peter,
theme  pizza:p2[
name  g,
size  large, base  thin,
toppings  {mushroom, peppers, cheese}
   ] ]    ]
(C1.2)
Similarly, Susan’s promise for delivery of a pizza of a specific type can be represented as:
promise:e3[
agent  susan, recipient  peter
theme  delivery:e4[
agent  susan, recipient  peter,
theme  pizza:p3[
size  large, base  thin,
toppings  {mushroom, peppers, cheese}
    ] ]    ]
(C2.1)
It should be easy to see how C-logic constructs can be written for other variations of Susan’s promise that were
discussed earlier.  (In all of these examples, persons Susan and Peter are represented using simple constants.
Naturally they could also be represented as structured objects of type person whose name attributes have the
values ‘Susan’ and ‘Peter’ respectively.)
As examples (C1.1) and (C1.2) illustrate, such a representation affords an explicit distinction between two kinds
of constants, namely those that name object/event instances and those that name object/event types.  There are
further advantages to using C-logic terms for the representation of messages.  The formulation in C-logic is
more concise than the formulation via collections of assertions and the relation between F-events and the P-
events they bear as their themes is easier to note.  The representation allows deductive retrieval of information to
the level of detail that is of interest.  We can, for example, pose queries to retrieve the agent, or recipient or
theme, or all of these features of a promising or requesting event.  As regards queries about the theme of such
promising or requesting events, we can in turn retrieve the whole structured term or any particular attributes of
interest.  For example evaluation of the query “What did Susan promise?” against (C2.1) could yield an answer
at the required level of granularity, ranging from “a delivery”, to “a delivery of a pizza”, to the full description
of the stipulated delivery e4 and its pizza p content.
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The fact that C-logic expressions have both direct semantics and a translation into FOL makes it possible to mix
C-logic expressions (used for syntactic convenience) with FOL expressions that represent additional information
about the messages and the context in which parties exchange them or constraints that can be used to establish
whether the exchange is meaningful.  In this way, prima facie representations of messages can be syntactically
distinguishable from context and constraint representations while at the same time directly usable by the same
computational methods.
4 The --- representation
We turn now to the original FLBC framework [13] and in particular to its method for associating the
representation of events such as requests, promises, and other speech acts, with representations of the
propositional content of those acts.  Kimbrough [13] observes that statements about promissory utterances such
as “Susan promised Peter to deliver a pizza” can be paraphrased as “there is a promising event in which the
speaker (agent) is Susan and the recipient is Peter, and in which Susan keeps this promise if and only if she does
something that causes there to be a delivery of pizza to Peter”.  The representation of Susan’s promise in the
original FLBC framework takes the following form. For simplicity we assume that Susan promises to deliver a
specific named pizza f—nothing turns on this.
 e[promise(e)  agent(e, susan)  recipient(e, peter) 
      e’[delivery (e’)  agent(e’, susan) 
beneficiary(e’, peter)  theme(e’, f) 
sake(e’, e)])]
(K1)
Notice that there is no explicit association of the promise event e with the delivery event that is promised; that
relationship is captured implicitly through the set of conditions specifying what renders the promise ‘kept’.  The
sake(e’,e) condition is required to ensure that several different promises to deliver (the same kind of) pizza
are not all automatically kept by one single delivery.  This condition is sometimes omitted when similar
examples are discussed in Kimbrough’s papers; we understand (personal communication) that such a condition
is intended to be included. We conjecture later, in section 5.1, why this condition is sometimes included,
sometimes not—there is a certain ambiguity in the term ‘kept’.
The     	
  	 
 
 		 
   
 
	  	 		
  
	 
  
all possible worlds it is the case that’.  The use of the modal operator   
		 
    
problems.  We discuss this aspect of the representation separately in the following section.
The general form of representations such as (K1) is the following:
      )
Here,  corresponds to the conjunction specifying the type of message (promise, request etc.) and attributes
such as its agent and its recipient (but not its ‘theme’).   is the device by which the -event is  associated to its
content: promises can be ‘kept’, requests can be ‘honored’, assertions can be ‘veridical’, and so on.   stands for
the conditions that need to be satisfied in order for the given message to be accorded status ; in the
representation (K1),  corresponds to the set of conditions describing the promised delivery event.  More
generally still, it is sometimes convenient to attach further conditions to the content of the -event.  The general
form of an FLBC message is therefore (‘the --- form’) as follows:
     	 (  ))
(S)
The  component stands for the extra conditions, empty in all the examples considered so far.  We will discuss
this component later in section 5.
4.1 Elimination of the modal logical component
The use of the modal operator     --- representation raises a number of what seem to us to be very
severe problems.  First, there is the question of which specific modal operator to employ. What kind of logical
properties should it exhibit? It has been suggested that nothing much may turn on the choice: it can be left to
personal preference. Yet this seems very unsatisfactory. Surely it cannot be completely arbitrary. There must be
some principles on which to choose between candidates. This is a far from trivial matter, however, especially
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when, as here, details of interactions between the modal operator and quantifiers have to be considered as well.
Second, besides the choice of operator itself, the representation is no longer in FOL. Standard FOL methods—
for reasoning with the representation, answering queries, checking constraints, and so on—are not immediately
applicable.
Kimbrough suggests that the modal operator   
  
  
	
 			 	 
	  
FOL by encoding the accessibility relation in the semantics of     	
 Thus the statement
“Susan promised Peter to deliver a pizza” can be paraphrased as “there is a promising event in the actual world,
a*, of which the agent is Susan and the recipient is Peter, and for any possible world w accessible from the
actual world a*, the promise is kept in that world, if and only if there is a delivery event e’ in that world,
such that Susan is the agent of the event, the beneficiary of the event is Peter, and the theme of the event is the
pizza”.  This leads to the following representation in FOL:
 e[promise(e, a*)  agent(e, susan, a*)  recipient(e, peter, a*) 

w [accessible(w, a*) 	 (kept(e,w)   e’ [delivery(e’, w) 
agent(e’, susan, w) 
beneficiary(e’, peter, w) 
theme(e’, f, w)
sake(e’, e, w)])]]
(K1.1)
But this raises two further issues, namely: (i) what is an appropriate definition for the accessibility relation ?
(which is another way of asking what properties the modal operator   	  
   
 	
representation be used (queried, checked)?
Here is an alternative suggestion. Instead of quantifying over possible worlds, let us quantify over possible
events.  This requires no additional machinery, simplifies the representation, and brings it back within the scope
of standard computational methods for FOL.  Quantifying over possible events suggests the following
representation in place of the original (K1):
 e[promise(e)  agent(e, susan)  recipient(e, peter) 

e’(kept(e, e’)  [delivery (e’)  agent(e’, susan) 
beneficiary(e’, peter)  theme(e’, f) 
sake(e’, e)])]
(qK1)
The binary predicate kept(e,e’) can be read as expressing that promise e is ‘kept’ (perhaps ‘fulfilled’ might
be better) by the occurrence of the event e’.  Clearly the method can be generalised to any similar
representation in the general --- form.  In place of
 e[(e)    (e) 	 [(e)   e’(e,e’)])]
we are suggesting the FOL formulation:
 e[(e)  
e’((e) 	 [(e,e’)  (e,e’)])]
We are not claiming of course that the two representations (K1) and (qK1) are formally equivalent; that would
depend on detailed properties of the operator   
	  	 ! 
 		 
 " 		
the spirit of the original FLBC whilst offering considerable advantages in terms of simplicity and ease of use.
Besides providing a means of circumventing the limitations of material implication (), the main function of
the modal operator     --- representation is to provide a device for creating intensional contexts. It is
generally accepted, for example, that promising, in common with most other types of speech acts, creates
intensional contexts in which substitution of equivalents cannot be done confidently: “…[T]o promise that you
will come to the party is not the same as to promise that you will skip Esmeralda’s wedding, even if you skip
Esmeralda’s wedding if and only if you come to the party” [13]. If x promises P and P is logically equivalent to
Q, it does not necessarily follow that x promises Q. If Q turns out to be false, however, then it does follow
(according to Kimbrough, and we agree) that the promise of P is broken (not kept). The modal   
 	
Kimbrough’s device for creating a suitable intensional context. Our suggestion is that quantifying over possible
events also provides a means for creating intensional contexts.
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In Skolemised form (qK1) can be written as follows.
promise(e3)
agent(e3, susan)
recipient(e3, peter)

e’(kept(e3, e’)  [delivery (e’)  agent(e’, susan) 
beneficiary(e’, peter)  theme(e’, f) 
sake(e’, e3)])
(qK1’)
Because of the translation between C-logic and FOL, the representation (qK1’) can also be rewritten using the
structured C-logic syntax to specify the attributes of the event e3 The details are simple and so we do not show
them here.
The biconditional in the last sentence can be re-written as two separate implications:

e’(kept(e3, e’)  [delivery (e’)  agent(e’, susan) 
beneficiary(e’, peter)  theme(e’, f) 
sake(e’, e3)])
(qK2)

e’(kept(e3, e’) 	 [delivery (e’)  agent(e’, susan) 
beneficiary(e’, peter)  theme(e’, f) 
sake(e’, e3)])
(qK3)
Both these can be converted to clausal form and the resulting sets of clauses can be used for computational
purposes in different ways, as we now discuss.
4.2 Retrieval method
We take it that the purpose of FLBC is to make perspicuous what is being requested, promised, delivered and so
on in a message, within the context of agreed predicates for the types of speech acts employed, the name
constants used and so on.  The formulation of messages in the --- scheme makes the handling of retrieval
queries awkward.  Suppose that one wants to determine what Susan promises.  One way is by inspecting the
representation, that is, by scanning or parsing the representation to extract the component  following the 
symbol.  If that is to be the retrieval method, however, then there is no particular value in having adoped a
logical formulation in the first place: any convenient syntactic device would do just as well.
It may seem that the conditions  representing the content of the promise cannot be retrieved from the ---
representation using standard (deductive) query evaluation methods.  It is true that a query on the -component,
in this example (where e3 is the constant serving as the object identifier for the promising event brought about
by Susan) a query of the form:
?-kept(e3, X).
does not work.  Depending on the query processing mechanism employed, possible answers generated by this
query are either yes/no, or a conjunction of conditions ’ such that

e(kept(e3, e)  ’(e3, e))
is a logical consequence of the representation.  Even in the latter case, there is no guarantee that the retrieved
conditions ’ will be identical to the -conditions as written in the representation: ’ will be logically
equivalent to  but not necessarily identical to .  This is clearly undesirable.  As already discussed, promising,
and many other kinds of speech acts, create intensional contexts in which substitution of equivalents cannot be
performed confidently: to know what was promised we need to be able to retrieve exactly the conditions  and
not merely something logically equivalent to .
However, there is a way of using standard computational methods (such as Prolog or C-logic) to retrieve
elements of the message from its representation.  As already observed, the biconditional defining ‘kept’ in
(qK1’) can be rewritten as two separate implications, both of which can be re-written in clausal form.  For
retrieval purposes, the useful half is the following
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e’(kept(e3, e’) 	 [delivery (e’)  agent(e’, susan) 
beneficiary(e’, peter)  theme(e’, f) 
sake(e’, e3)])
 (qK3)
which is re-written in clausal form as follows:
delivery(E)  kept(e3, E).
agent(E, susan)  kept(e3, E).
beneficiary(E, peter)  kept(e3, E).
theme(E, f)  kept(e3, E).
sake(E, e3)  kept(e3, E).
(qK3’)
Here we have employed the standard notation for clauses as used in logic programming, and the Prolog
convention that strings beginning with upper case letters are variables.  As usual, all variables in clauses are
implicitly universally quantified.
The clauses (qK3’) give us a simple means of retrieving any element of the description of the content of e3.  In
order to retrieve it, we add to the representation the (temporary) additional assertion:
kept(e3, e999).
where e999 (say) is any new constant not appearing in the representation.  This temporary assertion is
necessary to provide a value for the E variable and to satisfy the body of the clauses that essentially specify the
content of the promise e3.  The value of any attribute of interest of the theme of e3 can be retrieved by
formulating queries at the required level of detail.  For instance to determine the agent, beneficiary and theme of
the promised event (the delivery), the query is:
?- agent(e999, X), beneficiary(e999, Y), theme(e999, Z)
This works very simply in Prolog and can be easily combined with C-logic notation if desired.  Nested events
(“Peter promises Jim that he will request Susan to …”) can also be treated in this way though some care needs to
be taken to keep track of the temporary assertions.  The procedure of making the temporary ‘kept’, ‘honored’,
(more generally ) assertions, evaluating the query, and then removing the temporary assertions, can be
packaged up for the user’s convenience.  In similar fashion, it is also possible, though a little more awkward, to
use the method for checking that a message under construction satisfies any constraints.
So this then is our first suggested modification: abandon the modal operator and quantify over possible events
instead; rewrite the    component in clausal form.  In order to retrieve elements of a message from its
representation: make a temporary assertion , and then query the  attributes of interest, either in FOL or using
C-logic notation (or some other variant thereof).
4.3 Discussion
How does this modified --- representation using quantifiers compare to the representation scheme
introduced in the opening sections, where the content of a promise (or request, or other message type) was
represented by making an explicit assertion that one event is the ‘theme’ of another?  In fact the two
representation schemes are much more closely related than may at first appear, as we now show.
Suppose that for the purposes of retrieval, instead of packaging up temporary ‘kept’ assertions, we add once and
for all the assertion:
kept(e3, th(e3)).
or more generally the clause
kept(E, th(E))  promise(E)
()
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So now when we wish to extract, say the beneficiary of the event promised by Susan in e3, it is enough to
evaluate the following query:
?- beneficiary(th(e3), X)
There is no need to make any temporary assertions of any kind.
Notice that clause () is the Skolemised form of the following general statement:

e [promise(e) 	  e’ kept(e, e’)]
The intended reading is that for any promising event e there is an event e’ which, if it occurred, would render
the promise in e kept.  It is not to be read as stating that every promise is actually kept. Again, it may be felt that
there is something philosophically suspect about the naming of hypothetical events in this manner. What if event
e’ never occurs, or never could occur? What happens (Steve Kimbrough, private communication) when the
impossible is promised (as it often is)? As discussed earlier in section 3, we have no difficulty in naming
hypothetical events. There is nothing any more problematic in our view about referring to an event which does
not, could not, exist than there is in referring to a pizza object which does not, or could not, exist. The names are
simply place-holders used for building structured representations.
The representation (qK3’) can be further simplified. Since e3 is a promising event, the kept condition in the
clauses of (qK3’) can be resolved away, yielding the following set of simpler clauses:
delivery(th(e3)).
agent(th(e3), susan).
beneficiary(th(e3), peter).
theme(th(e3), f).
sake(th(e3), e3).
(qK3”)
Now one can see that this is essentially identical to the representation we employed in the earlier sections of the
paper, except that there we used a constant e4 to identify the theme of e3 instead of the functional term
th(e3), and we associated e4 to e3 by means of the predicate theme.  We could have written th(e3)=e4;
that is, in place of the version above of (qK3”) we could have:
th(e3)= e4.
delivery(e4).
agent(e4, susan).
beneficiary(e4, peter).
theme(e4, f).
sake(e4, e3).
We find it more convenient (and flexible) to write theme(e3, e4) instead.  We also avoid the problems of
reasoning explicitly with equality in the representation.
Clearly the method can be generalised to other kinds of speech acts: for every requesting event e there is an
event th(e) which, if it occurred, would make the request ‘honored’; for every asserting event e (that asserts
the occurrence of an event), there is an event th(e) which, if it occurred, would make the assertion ‘veridical’,
and so on.   In clausal form:
honored(E, th(E))  request(E).
veridical(E, th(E))  assertion(E).
This then is our second suggested modification: for practical purposes, instead of defining ‘kept’ (or ‘honored’
or ‘veridical’, or more generally ) for an event e in full, simply express the corresponding  conditions as a set
of assertions specifying the required properties of event th(e). The term th(e) stands for the (unnamed)
event that is the ‘theme’ of e. As a further modification, replace th(e) by a new constant e’, and add
theme(e, e’) to the representation.  This last step is optional (though we prefer it since it is much more
flexible and easier to deal with).
5 Monitoring the performance of business exchanges
It is natural to explore whether we could also make use of the other part of the ‘kept’ definition, i.e.
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e’(kept(e3, e’)  [delivery (e’)  agent(e’, susan) 
beneficiary(e’, peter)  theme(e’, f) 
sake(e’, e3)])
(qK2)
in order to provide an extended representation system in which one could check whether a promise had in fact
been kept, or more generally, in which the performance of promises, requests, replies, the evolution of the
message and business exchanges generally, could be monitored.  This seems to be outside the original
motivation for FLBC but let us consider it.
Whether or not we employ the original --- representation or the suggested alternatives discussed in
previous sections, we have to be able to distinguish, in the representation, between descriptions of events that
could happen and descriptions of events that have actually happened.
So let us add another possible attribute to the representation of events: mode(e, actual) will represent that
event e has actually happened. (We could have used a unary predicate ‘actual’ just as well.  The binary
predicate mode fits better with C-logic syntax.)
Now we have to be careful.  If as suggested in the previous section we read kept(e,e’) as saying that
(promise) e would be kept by e’ if e’ occurred, we need another predicate, say actually_kept, defined as
follows:
actually_kept(e, e’)  kept(e,e’)  mode(e’, actual)
We shall have reason to adjust this definition presently.  (Naturally we could also reserve the use of the
predicate ‘kept’ for this sense of actually kept, and use a different predicate for encoding the  conditions
defining the content of the promise.  We leave it like this.)
For use in combination with the clausal versions of the --- representation in the previous section, the
definition above produces the following clause:
actually_kept(E, th(E))  promise(E), mode(th(E), actual).
if we choose to use the th device, or
actually_kept(E, E’)  promise(E), theme(E, E’), mode(E’, actual).
if (as we do) we prefer the use of a theme assertion to the use of the function symbol th.
We have omitted the clause corresponding to the ‘only if’ half of the definition of actually_kept on the
assumption that the resulting representation is to be executed as a logic program, in Prolog or C-logic or some
other variant.  The ‘only if’ part is then provided implicitly by the usual semantics of logic programs.
Exactly similar considerations apply to formulating conditions for determining when requests are (actually)
honored, when directives are (actually) obeyed, and correspondingly for other speech act types of interest.
We noted earlier in section 4 that in the original --- representation the sake condition is sometimes
included and sometimes not when Kimbrough discusses similar examples.  We conjecture that perhaps one
reason for this is that there is a certain ambiguity in the intended use of ‘kept’ in the --- representation of
promises in the original FLBC framework. The sake condition is only really necessary when determining
whether a promise has actually been made; as already observed, this is outside the original motivation of FLBC
though sometimes implicit in some of the discussions.
The actually_kept definition above, and its corresponding clausal representation, however, embody an
important over-simplification, which we turn to now.
5.1 When is a promise kept?
In the example message exchange of section 2, Peter requests (e1) a particular kind of delivery event (labelled
e2 in the representation shown).  Susan responds (e3) by promising a delivery event (labelled e4 in the
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representation).  Suppose that a delivery event e16 (say) is added to the representation, recorded as being in
response to Susan’s promise.
In C-logic syntax, the representation of Susan’s promise is:
promise:e3[agent  susan, recipient  peter, mode  actual,
theme  delivery:e4[
agent  susan, recipient  peter,
theme  pizza:p4[
size  large, base  thin,
toppings  {mushroom, peppers, cheese}
] ] ]
The representation of the delivery event e16 is as follows (C-logic syntax):
delivery: e16[agent  susan, recipient  peter, mode actual,
theme  pizza:p16[
size  large, base  thin,
toppings  {mushroom, peppers, cheese}
]
sake  e3
]
Notice that the identifiers for the two pizzas are different; we are assuming here that the pizza promised was not
identified by name.
It would seem natural to say that, according to the representation, Susan’s promise in e3 has been (actually)
kept by the delivery event e16.  However, the earlier formulation of actually_kept, that is
actually_kept(E, E’)  promise(E), theme(E, E’), mode(E’, actual).
does not work: the theme of e3 is e4, not e16.  What we require is a refined definition to express the intuition
that “a promise is kept if something that matches what was promised becomes actual”.  In clausal form:
actually_kept(E, E’) 
promise(E),
theme(E, E’),
mode(E”, actual),
matches(E”, E’),
sake(E”, E).
The predicate matches will be defined separately, below.
It seems to us that recording the occurrence of the delivery event simply by asserting:
mode(e4, actual).
is quite unworkable.  For one thing, we would then be unable to record extra attributes of the delivery event,
such as the name of the driver, the time of delivery, the person accepting delivery, and so on, without thereby
altering the representation of what it was that Susan promised in e3.  For example, adding
agent(e4, dave).
to the representation would indicate not only that Dave delivered the pizza but that Susan had promised that
Dave would deliver the pizza (which she did not).  Moreover, in the example, Susan’s promise (e3) to deliver
pizza (e4) was made in response to a request (e1) from Peter that pizza be delivered (e2).  Why then record
the actual delivery of the pizza by the assertion mode(e4, actual) and not by the assertion mode(e2,
actual)? Why the difference between e2 (the content of Peter’s request) and e4 (the content of Susan’s
promise) in the first place? In the representation style that has been adopted throughout, event naming constants
are merely devices for building structured representations, whether they are viewed as Skolem constants as in
FOL or as object identifiers as in C-logic.  e2 and e4 and now e16 are different event descriptions, for the
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same reason that the pizza identifier p4 in the description of event e4 cannot be the same as the pizza identifier
p16 in the description of event e16.
How then do we determine that the actual occurrence of event e16, and the delivery of pizza p16, matches the
event e4 promised by Susan and the promised pizza p4? As a first shot, we can at least require that the
stipulated attributes of the promised event (Y in the definition below) are all features of the actual event (Z):

Z
Y [matches(Z,Y) 
[delivery(Y) 	 delivery(Z)] 
 
X[agent(Y,X) 	 agent(Z,X)] 

X[recipient(Y,X) 	 recipient(Z,X)] 
      :

T1 
T2[theme(Y, T1)  theme(Z, T2) 	
matches_object(T2, T1)]
]
Here matches_object will be defined in similar style to specify when two (here, pizza) descriptions match
one another; again, as a first shot we can require that all the attributes of the stipulated (pizza) description T1
must be present in the actual pizza description T2.  To be written in full these definitions of matches and
matches_object require a list of the possible attributes for each type of object, but that is easily supplied.
Athough such definitions will be adequate for simple purposes, one can see that they are only approximations.
First, suppose buyer X orders a pizza with mushroom, cheese and peppers topping, but is actually delivered a
pizza that has not only mushrooms, cheese and peppers topping, but bacon and pepperoni topping too.  Does the
pizza match the specification of the pizza that was ordered? Of course, one could say that the value of the
topping attribute of the ordered pizza is {mushroom, cheese, peppers} and the value of the topping attribute of
the delivered pizza is {mushroom, cheese, peppers, bacon, pepperoni} and the values of these two attributes are
not the same.  (This cannot be distinguished in C-logic but could be done using some other variant.) But that is
really beside the point.  Suppose that in addition to the ordered toppings the pizza was delivered with slices of
ham laid over the top.  Would such a pizza be regarded as matching what had been ordered?  Not if it had been
ordered by a vegetarian perhaps.  Or suppose that the promised pizza was supposed to come with mushrooms in
the topping but when delivered it is found to contain a topping made almost entirely of cheese and peppers with
just the tiniest slivers of mushrooms present.  Would that pizza match the description of what had been ordered?
Second, deciding when to deem a promise as ‘kept’, an obligation fulfilled, even a pizza ‘delivered’, are in
general far from trivial matters.  Much of the litigation that arises in the course of a business exchange will
centre on resolving conflicting views of what renders a promise ‘kept’.  Much of the detail in trading
conventions, such as the UN convention governing the sale of goods, is concerned with spelling out the
conditions under which an item is deemed to have been ‘delivered’, the time a message is deemed to have been
‘received’, and so on.
Of course it is difficult to imagine how some of these points could arise in connection with promises to deliver a
pizza.  But not all business messages will be about pizzas.  Suppose Susan’s promise had been about the
delivery not of pizza but of some other very expensive perishable object.  Or suppose Peter had requested and
been promised the delivery of a thousand pizzas to be delivered every day at a specified time and place.  In
those circumstances we surely would be concerned with determining much more precisely the exact
specification of each pizza, and what exactly it means to ‘deliver’.  In our experience of representing contracts
in areas of construction and engineering [5], much of the detailed content of a contract was concerned with
precisely this issue.  And not only are the details spelled out, there are agreed mechanisms for testing that each
item (each pizza for our example here) meets the specified standard, agreed equipment to be used for
measurements, agreed arbitration mechanisms and so on.  During the contract formation stage, the parties try to
anticipate such eventualities and agree explicit terms that will determine the conditions under which a promise
will be deemed as having been ‘kept’.  At the very least they will agree on the arbitration mechanisms to be used
should any dispute arise during the performance of the contract.  During the resolution of disputes, knowledge
of common business practice, common sense, existing legislation, even precedent might be used to assist in
establishing whether requirements have been met.
In general terms, then, the predicate matches is essentially a representation of the concept of ‘counts as’
discussed by Jones and Sergot [8] in the context of formalising qualification/classification norms, that is to say,
the rules that specify the conditions under which, within a given context agreed by two or more parties (their
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contract), a promise is deemed as kept, or more generally, a state of affairs A is deemed to count, for the
purposes of the agreement, as state of affairs B.
We are not suggesting that all this needs to be represented in an FLBC message.  On the contrary, our
understanding is that FLBC is intended for representation of routine business exchanges that take place within
some agreed context.  We have already made this point in the introduction.  For simple messages about simple
things, matches as defined above is going to be adequate.  As we move to more complicated messages, we
will need to consider whether to represent something of the procedures and mechanisms by which the
performance of the business exchanges will be determined.  The definition of matches will then become
increasingly case-specific, and of arbitrary complexity. However, this does not mean that the formal
representation of such mechanisms is necessarily difficult. In practice we see little difficulty in formalising the
application-specific conditions that define matches (and hence actually_kept). Our point is that these
conditions, which are required for the purpose of monitoring the performance of business exchanges, are not the
same as the conditions that appear in the definition of kept, the device by which the content of a promise (or
other type of speech act) is represented in FLBC.
6 Other extensions and open problems
The modified FLBC framework can be extended further in a number of ways, some of which are
straightforward and do not pose significant technical or theoretical problems.  For example, should it be
desirable, times can be associated with events by extending the set of thematic rôles (attributes in C-logic
formulations) and an underlying temporal framework may be used to reason about temporal relations between
events and the states of affairs created by those events.  The event calculus [19] fits very easily in the FLBC
framework, for example.
For some applications, such as those aiming to support contractual activity, there may be value in having an
explicit representation of the obligations that are assumed by a party as a result of a promise issued to a counter-
party.  One way of representing this explicitly is to use a framework such as the event calculus to specify the
effects of promising events in terms of the obligations and other relationships that they initiate and terminate.
Another way, simpler but less expressive, is via the use of general rules applicable to promissory messages, such
as the one shown below:

x
a
r
t[(promise(x)  agent (x, a)  recipient(a, r)  theme(x, t)) 	
 y[obligation(y)  bearer(y, a)  counter_party(y, a)  theme(y, t)]]
Similarly we could develop general rules to express the relationship between keeping a promise and fulfilling its
associated obligation.  We leave it to future research to determine the practical benefits of such extensions.
When formulating constraints on what makes an exchange of messages well-formed, for example, it may be
easier and more natural to frame some of these constraints in terms of obligations rather than in terms of the
promising events that create them.
Apart from such relatively easy extensions, there are harder issues that need to be addressed.  The content of a
promise (and other types of messages) is often much more complicated than a single one-off event.  For
instance, in the terms of the pizza-ordering example, Susan might promise to deliver the pizza by motorbike if it
is raining.  She might promise to deliver either thick-base pizza or thin-base pizza with extra cheese topping,
depending on availability.  She might promise to deliver pizza every day at 7:00 pm, packed in red heat-
insulated boxes.  Although some of these examples are again rather fanciful in the context of a simple one-off
pizza purchase, they are perfectly normal in other business settings.  If Susan is a pizza manufacturer and Peter
is a retailer, Susan might well promise to deliver a specified number of pizzas at a set time every day, to varying
specifications depending on availability, and with more or less complex pricing arrangements according to the
types of pizza delivered.  In some of the sample engineering contracts we have previously examined [5], for
example those concerning the supply of natural gas, the details of how, how often, what quantity, and what
quality of gas is to be delivered were typically given by an extremely complex set of interrelated conditional
statements and procedures.  They reveal conditional promises, promises issued periodically, promises whose
content is to be fulfilled periodically, and more complex constructs exhibiting all of these in combination.
Indeed, in the example exchange of this paper, Susan promises to deliver a specified pizza by 7:30 pm, or if
after 7:30 pm to deduct £1.00 from the bill.  The content of this promise can be represented in different ways: as
a single delivery event where the price depends conditionally on the time of the delivery.  Or, better perhaps, as
two separate promises, one (unconditional) to deliver a pizza, and a second, conditional one, to reduce the bill
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by £1.00 in case the time of the delivery is later than 7.30 pm.  The second is arguably a more accurate
representation of what Susan promised.
The treatment of simple conditional promises in FLBC is already an unresolved issue.  In the original FLBC
framework, the  component of the --- scheme is intended to be used for representation of conditional
utterances of the form “x promises that if  then  (will occur).” Thus, when Susan promises “if fax
confirmation is received by 7:00 pm then the pizza will be delivered by 7.30 pm”, the  component would be a
representation of the condition “if fax confirmation is received by 7:00 pm.” Conditional elements of the
promise itself, such as how price depends on time of delivery or how mode of transport depends on whether it is
raining, can be accommodated within the  component.  And likewise for the representation of conditional
requests (“x requests that if it is raining y should send a taxi”), conditional directives, and other speech acts.
The  component, empty in all the examples discussed earlier, does not hinder translation to the clausal version
of the --- scheme: the clauses of the representation simply include additional conditions corresponding to .
So, for illustration, if the promise (e3) made by Susan had been a conditional one, of the form “if fax
confirmation is received by 7:00 pm then the pizza will be delivered by 7:30 pm”, the clausal representation
(qK3’) would come out as follows:
delivery(E)  kept(e3, E), confirmation_received(e3).
agent(E, susan)  kept(e3, E), confirmation_received(e3).
beneficiary(E, peter)  kept(e3, E), confirmation_received(e3).
theme(E, f)  kept(e3, E), confirmation_received(e3).
sake(E, e3)  kept(e3, E), confirmation_received(e3).
Here confirmation_received(e3) stands for the condition “fax confirmation is received by 7:00 pm.”
There is nothing problematic about expressing this condition in full in the FLBC framework.  We have omitted
the details so as not to distract from the main point we are seeking to make.  (The argument e3 is necessary to
write the conditions out in full.)
In the simplified form corresponding to clauses (qK3”), where the ‘kept’ condition has been eliminated (and
replacing th(e3) by an explicit ‘theme’ assertion in the style we prefer), we obtain:
theme(e3, e4).
delivery(e4)  confirmation_received(e3).
agent(e4, susan)  confirmation_received(e3).
beneficiary(e4, peter)  confirmation_received(e3).
theme(e4, f)  confirmation_received(e3).
sake(e4, e3)  confirmation_received(e3).
This is all quite straightforward.  There is a problem, however: we are again faced with the question of how to
retrieve, from the representation, a description of what it was that Susan promised.  A query such as
?- theme(e3, X)
which worked previously when  was empty now produces at best an answer qualified by conditions ’
logically equivalent, but not necessarily identical, to .  All the points we made earlier in section 4 about the
inadequacy of this kind of retrieval apply equally here.  Similarly, any conditional elements in the  component,
such as varying prices, modes of delivery, and so on, can be expressed in the framework, but cannot be retrieved
by querying the representation.
Notice that for the purposes of monitoring whether promises have in fact been kept, there is no problem:
whether the promise has actually been kept will depend only on whether it is possible to determine from the
representation that conditions  are established, and there is nothing problematic about that.  Notice also that
when we are interested in monitoring whether promises have in fact been kept, there is no need to distinguish in
the representation between what we have been calling a conditional promise, a message or utterance of the form
x promises that if  then  (will occur)
and a conditional expression about the making of an unconditional promise, of the form
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if  then x promises that  (will occur)
Clearly there is a difference between these two forms of expression. The difference can be ignored if the only
purpose of the representation is to support the monitoring of message exchanges.  If the purpose of the
representation is to support the storage and retrieval of messages, however, then the difference cannot be
ignored: we have to be able to tell whether the message is of the first or second form. And since retrieval by
logical deduction cannot be supported (as we have argued), conditional utterances of the first form remain
problematic, even for the --- scheme.
A possible solution is to express the content of a conditional promise (request, directive, assertion, and so on for
other types of messages) as another kind of structured object, an object with attributes pre-conditions (say) and
consequent, both of which have values which are (representations of) FOL formulas.  This is an ugly and
unappealing approach, however, which we are not proposing to pursue.
7 Conclusion
We have made two suggested modifications to the original FLBC representation scheme: first, to eliminate the
need for the problematic modal logical component by replacing quantification over possible worlds by
quantification over possible events, and second, to re-write in Skolemised clausal form in order to enable the
application of readily available computational methods.  An optional further modification, which we prefer,
allows one event description to be recorded as the ‘theme’ (‘patient’ or ‘direct object’) of another event.
Kimbrough’s latest formulation [14] suggests that he agrees that such modification is useful.  The use of a
syntax such as that of C-logic can also be useful in the construction of complex structured representations.
We have pointed out two different computational tasks, with differing computational and representational
requirements. Task 1 is to retrieve from the FLBC representation of a message or utterance all the components
of interest, including in particular a representation of what has been promised, requested, commanded, asserted,
as the case may be. Task 2 is to determine, given a representation of what events have actually occurred,
whether promises have in fact been kept, requests honored, directives fulfilled, and so on, in order to provide a
system for monitoring the performance of business and message exchanges.  For simple messages, both of these
computational tasks can be supported without difficulty using standard computational methods.
We have also discussed some further extensions and some open problems.  The first of the computational
tasks—the retrieval of message components from their representation—raises unresolved problems concerning
the representation of conditional messages/utterances, that is to say, in speech act terms, utterances whose
propositional content contains conditional (and other more complex) constructs.  Although simple instances can
be expressed in the FLBC scheme, they cannot be retrieved using logical querying methods.  For the second
computational task, the monitoring of message exchanges, the existing FLBC representation copes adequately
with conditional utterances but raises a different set of questions about how to determine whether one event,
typically one that has actually occurred, matches the description of another event, typically one representing the
propositional content of a promise, request, directive, or other speech act.  The resolution of these two sets of
problems identifies directions for future developments.
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